Ulysses-Hermes: The Ethic of the Foreigner by Formenti, Carlo
Differentia: Review of Italian Thought 
Number 3 Combined Issue 3-4 Spring/Autumn Article 7 
1989 
Ulysses-Hermes: The Ethic of the Foreigner 
Carlo Formenti 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.library.stonybrook.edu/differentia 
Recommended Citation 
Formenti, Carlo (1989) "Ulysses-Hermes: The Ethic of the Foreigner," Differentia: Review of Italian 
Thought: Vol. 3 , Article 7. 
Available at: https://commons.library.stonybrook.edu/differentia/vol3/iss1/7 
This document is brought to you for free and open access by Academic Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Differentia: Review of Italian Thought by an authorized editor of Academic Commons. For more 
information, please contact mona.ramonetti@stonybrook.edu, hu.wang.2@stonybrook.edu. 
Ulysses-Hermes: 
The Ethic of the Foreigner 
Carlo Formenti 
1. PARADOXES OF RELATIVISM 
Critics of the process of the "technicization" of politics seem 
to strive above all for an objective of an epistemological order: to 
defend the arguments of political philosophy from the totalizing 
claims of scientific rationality, to affirm the existence of an unbridg-
able gap between ethical and scientific truth. 
The collusion between science and politics that has progres-
sively neutralized that gap consists of a sort of "division of labor." 
Science has the task of analyzing social interests, politics that of 
representing them. Against this project of a scientific foundation 
for ethics is counterposed the idea that ethics has no other reason 
for existing than individuals' more or less free and conscious de-
cision to conform their behavior to certain general rules. The citi-
zen-as individual, difference, freedom-has no interests, but 
only disinterested opinions. Free opinion cannot be represented 
because it comes into existence only when it appears publicly, in 
the course of a dialogic, communicative process. 1 The moment 
science wants to subsume human action under determinant 
natural "laws," forgetting that the historical event is the result of 
[Translated from the Italian by Michael Rocke] 
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the individual's actions and of their differences, and thus has a 
quality of the unexpected, the unforeseen, the new, then science 
becomes religion, it betrays modem disenchantment. That is, it 
betrays that unrenounceable "promise" of the modem according 
to which the world will be world-for-the-individual, "the place of 
opportunities, the prospect of his realization according to his strict 
autonomy. "2 But the theorists of radical disenchantment en-
counter two fundamental problems. 
First, their conception seems inspired by the traditional con-
trast between "two cultures." On one side there is science, en-
gaged in the search for regularity, for order, for the necessity that 
governs natural phenomena. On the other side there is humanistic 
culture, which investigates the world of social phenomena that, 
as the product of interaction among irreducible individualities, is 
not regulated by "laws" but rather by conventions, by artificial 
rules that are the product of decisions; it is a contingent world 
that could always be something different than what it is. However, 
as we shall soon see, such a conception is arguing with a science 
of necessity that no longer exists. 
Second, if every claim to found a transcendental ethics is 
refused, if the concrete certainty of individuality(ies) as a value is 
assumed, then the paradox of relativism is set off: How can I go 
from the given of individuality to value? How can I conjugate in 
the plural a value that, precisely because it is groundless, aspires 
to the absolute? That is, how can I keep the autonomy of each 
individual, of that concrete and multiple individual that is each 
one of us, from being transformed into the sovereign will of the 
Stimerian One? 3 
I would like to start from this second point by citing, almost 
aphoristically, several short passages from the work of Jan-
kelevitch, one of the contemporary philosophers who has dedi-
cated the most attention to the paradoxes of ethics. "Wretched 
plural! Every value is in itself infinitely valid, valid right up to the 
absolute"; "Harmony and complement among values does not 
exist; values are born independently, without taking account of 
each other, like liane in the forest"; "It is the plethora of values 
that constitutes evil! Ambiguous and fleeting, evil is in some way 
the overabundance of values .... a single virtue, separated from 
all the others, is a vice." But perhaps the most interesting state-
ment is this final one: "Evil is not, however, the plural in itself: 
virtues tum into dust because love has abandoned them. "4 The 
point of view toward disenchantment here is completely over-
turned. It is precisely the failure of the theological foundation, of 
the prospect of universal love, that renders vain any claim to the 
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valorization of individuality. The plural loses sense precisely be-
cause it triumphs, because it is "emancipated" from every refer-
ence to the One. 
To combat this thesis, the theorists of disenchantment must 
demonstrate that their position is not necessarily devoted to skep-
ticism, to absolute relativism. But this can occur only by somehow 
reintroducing a transcendental principle, a founding instance. 
And this is precisely what they do, by delegating to politics the 
role they want to take away from theology and science. 
Of course the task is not assigned to concrete political action, 
but to an ideal model of political rationality, to a polis that is 
founded not on the representation of interests but rather on the 
communicative process, on the free confrontation of disinterested 
opinions. 
Thus one enters the conceptual field delineated by the thought 
of Jurgen Habermas, the field of a communicative rationality which 
is asked to resolve the aporia of modern polytheism, of the conflict 
between demands formulated with claims of universality, 
analyzed by Weber. According to Weber, in the disenchanted 
world it is necessary to take into account not only the dualism 
between a position of value and reality, but also and especially 
the pluralism of positions of value-that is, the fact that there 
exist different divinities one can obey; and ethical conduct can 
reconcile neither the single rositions of value and reality nor the 
different positions of value. Habermas maintains, however, that 
in its different moments a fragmented rationality can preserve its 
unity in the form of procedural rationality. It is in dialogue, in 
communicative interaction, that the different claims to validity are 
recomposed on the basis of fixed rules of argumentation. 6 
But when he proposes to redimension the totalizing claims 
of scientific rationality by referring to a broader field of com-
municative rationality, Habermas falls into a paradox. In fact he 
maintains the Weberian distinction, even though he reformulates 
its assumptions, between ethics of intention and ethics of respon-
sibility: he who acts according to the first applies a principle inde-
pendently of the calculation of the consequences, while he who 
follows the second reflects on the value of the consequences of 
his actions and considers both the possibility of accomplishing 
them as well as the results. He takes responsibility for controlling 
events, for their ends, and for their possible "perverse effects." 
Now this conception, according to which it would in any case be 
possible to calculate rationally the consequences of action, is quite 
similar to that which identifies scientific rationality with the ability 
to foresee particular events. 
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The point of view of radical disenchantment, therefore, leads 
in tum to determinism, finding itself forced again to ask scientific 
reason for illumination. This outcome is even more paradoxical 
since, as we have already anticipated and as we will attempt now 
to argue, contemporary science appears increasingly distant from 
determinism. 
The crisis of classical models of scientific rationality, already 
clear in the transition to statistical-probabilistic models worked 
out in physics in the early decades of this century, has more 
recently been extended and widened with the development of 
the epistemology of the so-called sciences of complexity ( cyberne-
tics, systems theory, information theory, artificial intelligence, 
neurobiology, cognitive psychology, theory of evolution, ther-
modynamics of unbalanced systems, etc.). In particular, the con-
ceptual apparatus articulated on the notions of natural law and 
of objective observation of phenomena has shattered into pieces, 
while the most radical results of constructivist epistemology call 
into question the very existence of an objective reality and of a 
scientific knowledge capable even in principle of describing such 
a reality. 
In other words, the assumptions from which epistemology 
of complexity part are the following: 1) the "subjective" character 
of every scientific knowledge, due to the fact that the observer is 
involved in the system observed; 2) the object of knowledge is 
change rather than invariance. The two points are closely inter-
linked and intermixed with each other. 
The concept of natural law is reformulated: it no longer implies 
a unilinear causal relation between given events, but the pure and 
simple recognition that phenomena are subject to constraints, 
that-to use Mauro Ceruti' s terms-"in a given moment of a given 
possible world, not all possible worlds are accessible. "7 The idea 
of constraint also involves the existence of invariables, of a "back-
ground" that constitutes the reference point for the analysis of 
change. The background is not taken as a given, however, as an 
objective attribute of the observed phenomena, but rather as a 
construction of the observer. The process of scientific knowledge 
is described as interaction among certain rules laid down as con-
straints, chance and the contingency of particular events and 
choices, and the strategies of subjects who utilize rules and chance 
to construct new possibilities. 8 
We have then a relativistic and opportunistic conception that 
moves the problematic of scientific objectivity from the realm of 
subject-object relations, from observer-system observed, to the 
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realm of intersubjective relations among observers. While the trad-
itional theory of knowledge used to consider the relationship be-
tween knowledge and reality as a more or less close agreement, 
constructivism conceives it as an adaptation, in a functional sense, 
which in tum is the result of a multiplicity of com~lementary, 
antagonistic, and often contradictory points of view. "Belief" in 
the existence of an objective reality is substituted with the recog-
nition of the narrowness of the possible: certain ideas don't work, 
our ideas about the world are subject to a selection mechanism. 
The theory of knowledge thus tends to devise concepts similar to 
those of the theory of evolution, and at the same time interacts 
with the latter, throwing the classical evolutionist paradigm into 
crisis. 
In its classic formulation, the theory of evolution was vitiated 
by a teleological principle: natural selection encourages the survi-
val "of the fittest," thus determining constantly "higher" levels 
of organization of life." Thanks to this, the evolution of the species 
occurs "as if" nature contained an immanent principle of self-per-
fectioning. According to the new evolutionist paradigm, in con-
trast, natural selection functions in a negative way, both in 
phylogeny and in knowledge: it is not organisms or ideas that 
adapt to reality, it is reality that eliminates whatever is not vital. 10 
Evolution does not embody any "law of form," nor do its 
mechanisms operate as if they were following fixed ends. Evolu-
tion is rather a bricolage, the art of improvising. Given that or-
ganisms (and theories) cannot be transformed rapidly into some-
thing new every time the environment changes, organs and be-
havioral forms that were intended for other functions ( or for no 
function at all, that is, the product of casual mutation) must from 
time to time be "recycled" to cope with unpredictable environmen-
tal changes. 11 The selection operates with already available mate-
rial and "the resulting imperfections and bizarre solutions, put 
together as best as possible, starting with whatever is at hand, 
document a process that occurs in time beginning from unsuitable 
antecedents, not the work of a perfect architect. "12 If something 
like a "natural history" exists, it is a network of peculiarities, 
contradictions, freaks, that render it more unpredictable and free 
of normative determinations than even human history. Scientific 
rationality extended to a search for a few simple and universal 
laws capable of explaining all phenomena, even historical-social 
phenomena, no longer exists. Epistemology of complexity de-
scribes a world in which the new, the unexpected, the unique, 
the individual, are fully at home. 
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Indeed it is science that today could accuse humanistic culture 
of betraying disenchantment, an accusation that would be justified 
from at least two points of view: 1) the insufficient problematiza-
tion of the concept of the individual; 2) the assumption of com-
municative rationality as apriori to social relations. 
As Pietro Barcellona observes, after the contributions that sys-
tems theory and epistemology of complexity have given to sociol-
ogy, the individual can no longer be determined through the 
unitary figure of the subject, the owner of expectations and rights, 
"but spreads out into the multiform reality of existence, to which 
correspond strategies of action made available by a highly differen-
tiated system. "13 Individuality does not belong to the subject, but 
to the multiplicity of elements into which the subject is disinte-
grating. 
It becomes problematic, therefore, to assume that communi-
cation is an apriori that at once transcends and lays the foundation 
for individual identity and autonomy. Similarly to what has hap-
pened with the relationship between subject-object, knowledge-
reality, the problematic of identity and of intersubjective relations 
is reformulated in terms of the relationship between system and 
environment. Between the complex relations that constitute the 
individual subject and the complex relations that constitute social 
systems, there is no difference in substance, but rather a difference 
in level. No matter at what level of reality they are placed, identity 
and autonomy do not require a transcendental base inasmuch as 
the very notion of system implies the idea of its self-referentiality, 
that is to say the delimitation of a spatial-temporal field of actions 
endowed with sense, the possibility that the system may not react 
automatically to the stimuli of the environment, but may be capa-
ble of elaborating the environment's indeterminate complexity 
depending on its own internal organization. 
Systemic "monads," in contrast to those of Leibniz, do not 
possess a pre-established harmony, they are not guaranteed by a 
divine order. The notion of the self-referentiality of systems carries 
pluralism and disenchantment to its extreme consequences, and 
refutes as well that secularized "theology" that is implicit in the 
theory of communicative action, in the belief in the existence of 
an ideal community of dialogue. 
We should now ask ourselves what ethical principles should 
derive from this epistemological conception. Paul Watzlawick at-
tempted to synthesize them in the following way: a person who 
accepts radical constructivism' s point of view would be tolerant, 
insofar as someone who does not possess the absolute truth, but 
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only a more-or-less adequate vision of the world, must find it 
difficult to insist on the primitive idea, "He who is not with me 
is against me." He or she would, moreover, be responsible not 
only for his or her own dreams and failed aspirations but, much 
more generally, also for the known world and for the realities 
created by the fulfillment of his or her prophecies. Finally, such 
a person would be free, since whoever was conscious of being 
the creator of one's own reality would be equally conscious of the 
possibility of constructing it in a different way. 14 
And yet here the same questions that skeptical relativism can 
address to theorists of disenchantment arise again: Why should 
pluralism lay the foundations for tolerance, responsibility, and 
freedom? What rational arguments can I assert against the 
monads' will to power? Even if my world is only one among 
infinite possible worlds, why should it not be more important for 
me than all the others? Who or what can assure us against the 
reduction of reality to a pure game of strengths? 15 
2. THREE MET AP HORS 
Emanuele Severino's diagnosis of the outcomes of Western 
thought seems then to be confirmed: the collusion between 
nihilism and disenchantment prevents any argument to be op-
posed to the theses of skeptical relativism. Philosophical reason 
and scientific reason are based on the same assumption, that is, 
on the belief in the "becoming" of the world and on the possibility 
of dominating it. Philosophical and scientific pre-vision constitute 
the original form of the will to power. 16 
The paradox of ethics lies in the fact that it proposes to defend 
individual liberty against projects to "naturalize" human conduct, 
against its reduction to "unchangables," but, to plead its case, it 
appeals to the ethics of responsibility, to the calculation of the 
effects of action. The critique of technical-scientific rationality is 
formulated in the name of the very attitude that lies at the base 
of technical-scientific power: the conviction of being master of 
one's own actions and of mastering the things of the world through 
action. 
In defending the arguments of modern disenchantment, 
philosophy enters into competition with science on its own 
ground. And it loses. If in fact the objective is to "liberate" modern 
man from the terrorism of the law (natural and social), from deter-
minism, we have seen that science, in this sense, offers radical 
solutions. The conceptual apparatus of statistical-probabilistic 
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physics and of the sciences of complexity delineates a form of 
"forecast" that does not rule out the unpredictability of events 
and that salvages the unexpected, the new, the individual, a form 
of calculus of phenomena that "works but does not guarantee. "17 
For the first time, science has understood that the risk of 
unchangables is that of frustrating the very founding principle of 
Western rationality, of rendering "becoming" illusory. It is science 
that once again, therefore, manages to put itself forward as "the 
authentic remedy. "18 "Always act in such a way as to increase 
the number of choices," Heinz von Foerster proclaims. 19 In other 
words, if the supreme value is the goal of achieving wholes that 
are ever more ample and more differentiated in scope, the intrinsic 
ethic of science, then it is necessary to keep the forecast from 
neutralizing the future, it is necessary to destroy unchangables. 
Scientific knowledge thus claims a local, contingent, hypothet-
ical character. Forecasts can always be taken back, but above all 
the success of the forecast depends in large measure on casual 
factors. Technical-scientific rationality is the most powerful form 
of domination precisely because it is open to absolute unpredicta-
bility, because the will to power has been able to inscribe casuality 
and contingency in its own field. 
And yet science continues to turn to ethics, it never ceases 
to question it about the limits of the will to power, it implores the 
solace of a voice in the desert that science itself created. Who or 
what keeps the interrogation going despite the impossibility of 
an answer? 
If we do not want to choose the road indicated by Severino-if, 
that is, we consider the search for a completely alternative princi-
ple to Western rationality impossible-then we must ask ourselves 
whether there is an ethical requirement immanent in scientific 
knowledge that does not get consumed in the will to power. This 
requirement does exist. It springs not from the logos of science, 
but rather from science as narration. Radical disenchantment exists 
only as myth, as specific mythical narration of late modernity. 
"Theology" and the search for the absolutely other, for the One, 
for the origin, do not constitute a nostalgic residue of past ages 
but are a constitutive element of our culture, an element that 
today is revealed precisely through the scientific image of the 
world. 
In support of this claim I would like to call upon three 
metaphors used, respectively, by Gregory Bateson, Paul 
Watzlawick, and Michel Serres. 
Bateson recounts that, in order to explain his conception of 
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life sciences to a group of students interested in quite different 
subjects, one day he entered the lecture hall with a boiled crab 
and held this discourse: put yourselves in the shoes of an alien 
who has arrived on our planet for the first time, and try to ask 
yourselves how the imaginary visitor might understand that he 
had before him the remains of a life-form . A discussion then 
ensued that led to a first conclusion: the crab is symmetrical, here 
is the fundamental sign! However, someone then noted that the 
symmetry is imperfect: one of the two chelae is much larger than 
the other. The dialogue continued, allowing a final and decisive 
step to be made : the two chelae have different dimensions, but 
are identical with respect to the parts that comprise them and to 
their reciprocal relations. Life is recognized, therefore, by the exis-
tence of symmetries, rhythms, proportions, by a style of intercon-
nections among its constituent elements. Bateson then encouraged 
the others to reflect on why this observation is decisive, and led 
them to the conclusion that this depends on the fact that the 
knowing mind is organized in the same way as the known object. 
In this way he succeeded in explaining his idea of the relation 
between mind and nature, of what he defines as the "connecting 
structure," 20 of a "sense" that is born of a world constructed upon 
the counterpoint between difference and repetition. In the follow-
ing pages of the book in which this episode is recounted, the 
discourse is expanded to attack the status of scientific research: 
the observer can never grasp the totality of the structure, but 
always works only with parts of systems. Science can never verify, 
much less prove its hypotheses; it can only explore, attempt to 
reconstruct the parts that are unfamiliar beginning from those 
that are known, and be always exposed to the risk of error, of 
defeat. 
The second metaphor is a little story that Paul Watzlawick 
uses to explain the relationship between knowledge and reality 
according to constructivist epistemology. 21 Let's imagine, Watz-
lawick says, that a captain has to cross an unknown channel in a 
dark night, without the aid of a beacon or other navigational 
instruments. He will either successfully cross the channel or will 
be shipwrecked on the rocks . In the second hypothesis it will be 
clear that he steered a mistaken course, one might say he discov-
ered what the channel was not. If in contrast he makes it, this 
demonstrates only that he did not collide with any point along 
the coast. He does not know at all how the passage really was. 
His course was simply suited to a topography that remains un-
known, it did not "correspond" to it. All cognitive structures 
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operate in the same way: they do not establish the "best course," 
but only one of the possible courses in order to navigate in the 
world. "Reality" is manifested only negatively when it determines 
the failure of our expectations. We "know" a point only when we 
literally bump against it. 
The final metaphor, very well known by now, is that of the 
"Northwest Passage" used by Michel Serres. 22 According to Ser-
res, the blindness that the physical sciences and the human sci-
ences show toward each other, the ignorance of physics with 
respect to politics and of politics with respect to physics, cannot 
and must not be overcome by a recomposition, a "synthesis," 
between the respective points of view. This would in fact involve 
the collusion of one style of rationality with respect to the other. 
In contrast, the fluctuations, the questions that the two fields 
constantly direct toward each other, must be kept open, even 
while knowing they cannot find an answer. Only this attitude 
allows the continuation of the search for a way out, only this 
permits the exploration of the narrow passage (analogous to the 
famous search for the Northwest Passage between the Atlantic 
and the Pacific) between opposing "truths." This is a risky and 
interminable voyage that finds in itself its motivation and sense. 
The hope is not to land at the goal of a knowledge that is finally 
omni-comprehensive but rather that, along the twisting road, sci-
ence learns the lesson of philosophy, at least in part, and vice 
versa. 
The common elements among the three tales are clear: the 
idea of a voyage, of a difficult, dangerous, and unending explora-
tion; the fact that the voyage takes place in an ambiguous, fluid, 
inscrutable element, represented by the sea (the symbol is explicit 
in Watzlawick and Serres, mediated by the crab in Bateson); and 
finally the fact that this voyage has no true goal but that of continu-
ing indefinitely, of not ending tragically in disaster. 
According to the philosophy of the three authors just cited, 
then, the symbolic horizon of contemporary science is that ancient 
one of Ulysses, the voyager par excellence, it is the horizon of 
the Odyssey. 
Odyssey, poem of voyage, but, as Kerenyi rightly emphasizes, 
of a voyage that is not a ramble. 23 Ulysses is not a "wayfarer." A 
wayfarer is one who remains attached to the earth, the conqueror 
who constantly extends his estate. Ulysses is a voyager on account 
of his very existential condition, he who remains eternally sus-
pended, who almost dissolves in his continuous motion, he who, 
since he is free of all ties of community, vanishes from everyone, 
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even from himself. He is the individual who ceases to be subject. 
Again according to Kerenyi, the Odyssey is also the poem that 
is detached from the values of the heroic life affirmed by the Iliad. 
In the Iliad the life of the hero Achilles stands out against the 
destiny of a unique, conclusive, irreversible death. The life of 
Ulysses is instead permeated by the risk of a continuous and 
omnipresent death, the fluctuating world of life in continuous 
contact with death. Ulysses is suspended without interruption 
over the abyss that yawns beneath his feet without ever swallow-
ing him once and for all. 
Finally, Ulysses is the ambiguous hero, cunning, opportunist, 
thief, swindler, and oath-breaker. He certainly does not seem to 
be the ideal model on which to found an ethic! And yet there is 
a "double divinity" about Ulysses, the figure of a god who, while 
possessing these negative attributes, ennobles them within the 
framework of a knowledge of the origins of the world and of life. 
In fact he who, like Ulysses, feels at home in the shoes of the 
eternal voyager belongs to the world of Hermes, it is Hermes who 
is his guide, companion, and messenger. Like Ulysses, Hermes 
is constantly in motion, he practices the arts of cunning, of theft, 
of deception, an opportunistic god who knows how to transform 
contingency and chance into the stuff of constantly new inven-
tions, tricks, novelties. But it is just this relationship with disorder, 
with fortuitousness, that locates Hermes in a chaotic and primor-
dial dimension out of which is born a knowledge of origins, a 
knowledge to which the gods of order and of dominion have no 
access. Hermes is the psychopomp, he who draws and arouses 
souls from nothingness, and to nothingness reaccompanies them, 
god of births and deaths, he alone of the gods who knows the 
mystery of becoming. It is only Hermes, therefore, who can help 
us look with different eyes at the ethic of nihilism, to understand 
why radical disenchantment cannot abstain from questioning itself 
about value, about the sense of things, of life, and of the world. 
Not by chance did the figure of Hermes assume a fundamental 
role in Alexandrian culture and become part of the syncretistic 
Pantheon of Gnostic theology. The idea that the world we live in 
is ambiguous, illusory, contaminated by the errors of an evil demi-
urge; the idea of the unity of contraries, the conviction that differ-
ent truths can live together and be superimposed without ceasing 
to be truths; the idea that reality can never be grasped or dictated, 
that our knowledges are nothing but metaphors and that these 
metaphors refer to other metaphors, in an infinite hermeneutic 
circle-all this goes together with belief in the existence of a remote 
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and veiled truth, of a unique origin the memory of which is lost, 
of a hidden and by now impotent God who waits to be reawakened 
by our questions, by our search for salvation, for sense. 
Well then, the contemporary gnosis, our gnosis, is science-
the very science of nihilism and disenchantment, the science that 
has abolished every illusion of certainty, of objectivity, of sense 
from our age; the science of complexity that has given life to a 
universe of singularities, unpredictables, "monads." It is just this 
science that admits that disenchantment is impossible, that the 
demand for sense is constantly reborn out of the ashes, that the 
monads are necessarily destined to question themselves about the 
origin, about the One. 
The physicist Bernard D'Espagnat wrote: 
The field of the rational and of science is not reality in itself, rather 
it is the whole of the phenomena (as complex as they appear), it 
is the lived, empirical reality. As far as it is beyond the possibility, 
at least in part, of the rational and of science, it is neither phenome-
non nor action . . . it is precisely that indispensible something 
about non-solipsistic thought called Being, or reality in itself. 24 
While recognizing that contemporary physics has by now dis-
pelled any substantialist illusion, any "objective" referent of know-
ledge, D'Espagnat alludes to a distant, veiled reality whose exis-
tence cannot be left out of consideration without dispelling the 
very sense of scientific experience and research. 
Let us return to the principles of an ethic intrinsic to science, 
which Watzlawick, as we have seen, sought to synthesize in terms 
of tolerance, responsibility, and freedom. From the rational point 
of view, pluralistic epistemology is unable to justify these princi-
ples. The "monadology" of complexity has no arguments with 
which to defend ethical value, to tell us why each monad should 
not absolutize the pure given of its existence as value. Those 
principles emerge rather from the myth of science, from the scien-
tific image of the world. It is from the mythical narration of radical 
disenchantment that the truth emerges: the ethical question de-
rives from nothing, it is without any rational argument, it is a 
sheer question of sense, of salvation. 
Jankelevitch writes: 
Ethics goes in the direction of Being and asserts its unconditioned 
value: nonetheless, due to the contradictory demands of the 
monads, one cannot say yes to everything. Our condition becomes 
the relative preferability of more being to less being. 25 
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Only relativism can imagine the essence of the ethical question. 
The limit of the will to power cannot be established by the proceed-
ings of communicative rationality, by freely accepted rules of in-
tersubjective relations. The freedom of the ethical decision is never 
guaranteed, it is an event that is determined case by case. And 
this event does not spring from the acknowledgment of the rights, 
needs, and demands of other monads, of the infinite number of 
other individuals to whom I should grant equal dignity, but from 
the fact that I cannot abstain from asking myself about the abso-
lutely Other. 
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